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Kingdom versus Empire in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia
Abstract: This paper exa mi nes the role of the dis tin ction between the Persian kingdom and 
the Persian empire drawn in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia with the view to showing that Cyrus’s 
government of his empire does not lend itself to a darker reading, but rather that his style 
of rule is based on an aristocratic-meritocratic view of the world. 
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To view complex events through the prism of binary polarisation is dear to the Greek mentality.1 Xenophon is no exception, as seen in his con-
trasting the good and the bad in the context of philia and his support for the 
principle that justice is to help friends and harm enemies.2 This does not mean 
that Xenophon habitually perceives complex occurrences and processes through 
mutually opposed and exclusive factors. His efforts to overcome the public/pri-
vate dichotomy and his rejection of the vita activa/vita contemplativa antithesis 
testify to the contrary. However, presenting certain issues in the form of binary 
polarisation helps to simplify and explain them.
The Cyropaedia is an historical novel, not a faithful account of historical 
events.3 It is not surprising therefore that Xenophon departs to an extent from 
what actually took place. In making a distinction between the Persian kingdom 
and the Persian empire, however, his departure from the factual situation is such 
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1 See P. Vidal-Naquet, The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek 
World (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 10–11; P. Cartledge, Ancient 
Greek Political Thought in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009), 4–5; cf. 
also H.-J. Gehrke, “Die klassische Polisgesellschaft in der Perspektive griechischer Philoso-
phen”, Saeculum 36 (1985), 146–147; Ch. Mann, “Politische Gleichheit und gesellschaftli-
che Stratifikation. Die athenische Demokratie aus der Perspektive der Systemtheorie“, His-
torische Zeitschrift 286 (2008), 9–11.
2 The good – the bad (Xen. Cyr. 2.2.22–7; Mem. 2.6.14–27); cf. I. Jordović, “Ksenofont o 
Erosu i filiji”, Istraživanja 25 (2014), 9–23; justice is to help friends and harm enemies (Xen. 
Cyr. 1.4.15, 25; 1.6.11, 28–34; 4.5.20, 27–28; 4.6.1–10; 5.1.28; 5.4.32–36; 5.5.13–14; 8.7.6–7, 28; 
Mem. 2.1.19, 28; 2.2.2; 2.3.14; 2.6.35; 4.2.15–16; 4.5.10; Symp. 4.3; Anab. 1.36; Hier. 2.2).
3 Cic. QFr. 1.1.23; see D. L. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. Style, Genre, and Literary Technique 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1–13, esp. 2–3, 6; Chr. Mueller-Goldingen, Unter-
suchungen zu Xenophons Kyrupädie, (Stuttgart/Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1995), XIV, 2.
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that it will strike every reader.4 Since this deviation cannot be explained by refer-
ence to historical facts or any literary tradition, it must have been conscious and 
deliberate. This has led some scholars to conclude that Xenophon is indirectly 
criticizing his hero, and imperious behaviour.5
What strikes the reader is that Xenophon’s depiction of the Persian king-
dom bears little or no resemblance to historical Persia.6 The Persian king is not 
shown as a typical autocrat, although in reality he was. The extent of the de-
parture from historical reality becomes even greater if we remember that the 
Greeks perceived him as the prototype of a tyrant.7 Xenophon uses various ways 
to show us that he does not see the Persian king as a tyrant. To begin with, he 
seeks to show that the king does not rule all by himself: there are also the laws, 
officials and the council of elders. The laws, the purpose of which is the com-
mon good (koinon agathon), prevent people from living as they choose. They not 
only regulate the raising of children and the grooming of youths, but also very 
clearly order public life. This is reflected in the existence of the so-called free 
square (eleuthera agora) with its court and public buildings, but without traders 
or a market. The laws also assign a part of the free square to each of the four 
age groups (boys, youths, mature men, elders).8 Since the aim of the laws is the 
common good, family background is not a criterion for the right to a public of-
fice.9 Moreover, the Persian king’s officials are not reduced to mere executors of 
his will, as indicated by the stress placed on their submission to the laws and the 
common good. They are the ones who, in the schools of justice, teach righteous-
ness to the children.10 Young men who have passed through the school – mature 
men too – are at the officials’ bidding, so that these may make use of them for the 
4 See C. Nadon, Xenophon’s Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia (Los Angeles/
London: University of California Press, 2001), 32 n. 18, 121.
5 Cf. Gera, Cyropaedia, 285–299; D. Johnson, “Persians as Centaurs in Xenophon’s Cyropae-
dia”, TAPhA 135 (2005), 177–207, esp. 179–181, 203–205.
6 The discrepancy is such that the term Persian republic for the Persian kingdom has be-
come quite widespread in the modern scholarly literature; see Chr. Nadon, “From Republic 
to Empire: Political Revolution and the Common Good in Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus”, 
The American Political Science Review 90 (1996), 364; Nadon, Xenophon’s Prince, 30–1; P. J. 
Rasmussen, Excellence Unleashed: Machiavelli’s Critique of Xenophon and the Moral Founda-
tion of Politics (Lanham/Boulder/Plymouth: Lexington Books), 3–13; P. Carlier, “The Idea of 
Imperial Monarchy in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia”, in Xenophon, ed. V. J. Gray (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 333, 339.
7 See Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 95; C. Dewald, “Form and Content: The Question of 
Tyranny in Herodotus”. In Popular Tyranny. Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece, 
ed. K. A. Morgan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 33–35, 47–49.
8 Xen. Cyr. 1.2.2–4.
9 Xen. Cyr. 1.2.15.
10 Xen. Cyr. 1.2.6–7.
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common good.11 Twelve officers at the head of each of the four age groups see to 
it that all Persians conscientiously fulfil their duties so that they might become 
the best possible citizens.12 And finally, the Persian officials are not chosen by the 
king, but by the elders – citizens of over fifty years of age who have graduated 
from the schools of justice, served the state for ten years as youths and further 
twenty-five years as mature men.13
Xenophon seeks to show that the Persian king is not a tyrant also by 
saying virtually nothing about his powers, which is unusual for a work in the 
mirror-of-princes genre. It is true that Xenophon generally pays little attention 
to the nature of the Persian constitution, but even so, he is disproportionately 
terse about the king’s powers. He is content to say that the king regularly takes 
young men hunting, since that is the best preparation for war. The fact that he 
feels the need to underline that the king is the hegemōn in hunting and in war 
may be interpreted as an indication that the authority of the Persian kings is 
limited in other situations.14 As may be seen from Aristotle, the Greeks cited 
the Spartan kings, and not eastern autocrats, as an historical example of a thus 
limited kingly power.15 
A third way in which the Cyropaedia seeks to show that the Persian king 
should not be perceived as the prototype of an eastern despot is by comparing 
him with the Median king. On the one hand, both Cyrus and Cambyses see the 
role of the king as that of a shepherd and a father who bears the common good 
in mind and ensures willing obedience and reverence on the part of his subjects 
by the adept use of reciprocity.16 The Median king, on the other hand, is shown 
as the opposite of that ideal. Xenophon’s intention to contrast these two models 
of exercising royal authority is clear from his portrayal of the Median king Asty-
ages, who is shown in a much more favourable light than his father Cyaxares.17 
When Cyrus first meets his grandfather, Xenophon points out that the king 
wears makeup on his eyes and face, and contrasts the lavish Median dress with 
the modest garb favoured by the Persians.18 Shortly afterwards, in the course of 
11 Xen. Cyr. 1.2.9, 12–13.
12 Xen. Cyr. 1.2.5–14, esp. 4, 15.
13 Xen. Cyr. 1.2.9, 13–14; 8.5.22.
14 Xen. Cyr. 1.2.10.
15 Arist. Pol. 1285a3–30; Carlier, Cyropaedia, 339.
16 Xen. Cyr. 1.1.2–3; 1.6.8, 24–25; 3.1.28; 8.1.1–2, 15; 8.2.9, 13–14; 8.8.1.
17 See H. Breitenbach, “Xenophon von Athen”. RE 9.A.2 (1967), 1709–1710; B. Due, The 
Cyropaedia. Xenophon’s Aims and Methods (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1989), 55–62; 
B. Zimmermann, “Roman und Enkomion – Xenophons ‘Erziehung des Kyros’,” WJA (1989), 
101; Gera, Cyropaedia, 75–76, 103, 155–159; Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 182–186, 
202–203.
18 Xen. Cyr. 1.3.2; see also 1.5.1; 1.6.8; 2.4.1, 5–6; 4.5.54; cf. Gera, Cyropaedia, 155.
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a meal, Cyrus deplores the overly abundant and varied food of the Medes. As 
the conversation develops, he also condemns the Median attitude towards wine. 
While Astyages allows himself to be overcome by drink, which leads to his sub-
jects and he forgetting that he is their ruler, the Persian king Cambyses always 
knows when to stop.19 The role of the Median king as a contrasting example is 
vividly expressed in an observation by the Persian queen Mandane. The fact 
that she is also Astyages’s daughter lends additional weight to her words.20 Hav-
ing spent some time with her young son at her father’s court, Mandane decides 
to return to Persia. Cyrus, however, asks his mother to let him stay longer in 
Media. He assures her that he has learnt enough about justice in the school of 
justice, and that if he still has something to learn, his grandfather can teach him. 
Mandane replies that justice is not understood in the same way in Media and in 
Persia. The king of the Medes is a despot (despotēs) with unlimited power, infa-
mous for his conviction that he should have more than others. The Persian king 
does what is ordered by the state and accepts what is decreed, since his guiding 
principle is not his own will, but the law; this is so because the Persians consider 
equality as justice:
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά, ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, παρὰ τῷ πάππῳ καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις δίκαια ὁμολογεῖται. 
οὗτος μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν Μήδοις πάντων ἑαυτὸν δεσπότην πεποίηκεν, ἐν Πέρσαις 
δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν δίκαιον νομίζεται. καὶ ὁ σὸς πρῶτος πατὴρ τὰ τεταγμένα μὲν 
ποιεῖ τῇ πόλει, τὰ τεταγμένα δὲ λαμβάνει, μέτρον δὲ αὐτῷ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλλ᾽ ὁ 
νόμος ἐστίν. ὅπως οὖν μὴ ἀπολῇ μαστιγούμενος, ἐπειδὰν οἴκοι ᾖς, ἂν παρὰ τού-
του μαθὼν ἥκῃς ἀντὶ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τὸ τυραννικόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ πλέον οἴεσθαι 
χρῆναι πάντων ἔχειν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅ γε σὸς πατήρ, εἶπεν ὁ Κῦρος, δεινότερός ἐστιν, ὦ 
μῆτερ, διδάσκειν μεῖον ἢ πλέον ἔχειν: ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ Μήδους ἅπαντας 
δεδίδαχεν αὑτοῦ μεῖον ἔχειν; ὥστε θάρρει, ὡς ὅ γε σὸς πατὴρ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδέ-
να οὔτ᾽ ἐμὲ πλεονεκτεῖν μαθόντα ἀποπέμψει.
“Yes, my son,” said she; “but at your grandfather’s court they do not recognize 
the same principles of justice as they do in Persia. For he has made himself mas-
ter of everything in Media, but in Persia equality of rights is considered justice. 
And your father is the first one to do what is ordered by the State and to accept 
what is decreed, and his standard is not his will but the law. Mind, therefore, 
that you be not flogged within an inch of your life, when you come home, if you 
return with a knowledge acquired from your grandfather here of the principles 
not of kingship but of tyranny, one principle of which is that it is right for one 
to have more than all.” “But your father, at least,” said Cyrus, “is more shrewd at 
teaching people to have less than to have more, mother. Why, do you not see,” he 
went on, “that he has taught all the Medes to have less than himself? So never 
19 Xen. Cyr. 1.3.4–5, 10–11; Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 91–92.
20 Cf. Due, Cyropaedia, 55–62; Gera, Cyropaedia, 76–77, 103; Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 
12, 95.
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fear that your father, at any rate, will turn either me or anybody else out trained 
under him to have too much.”21
Mandane describes Astyages as the Greeks traditionally imagined a true 
tyrant – a self-centred and self-willed strongman who always wants to have 
more and puts himself above the law.22 In contrast, Cambyses can hardly be said 
to be a king, at least not according to Mandane who describes him as a leader 
of the people (prostatēs tou dēmou). In the traditional classification of good con-
stitutions, kingship is a form of government in which the monarch rules with 
an eye to the common advantage (koinon sympheron), in accordance with the 
will of its citizens and the laws.23 Mandane’s Persian king, however, goes one 
decisive step further. Not only is his will in accordance with the law and the will 
of the citizens but it is the polis that determines (tetagmena) what he should do 
and what he should have. As for Cambyses, we may more readily say that he is, 
like Thucydides’ Pericles, the first citizen (protos anēr) of the polis rather than a 
monarch.24 The decision to enter war, and for Cyrus to lead the Persian forces, 
is not made by Cambyses, but rather by the Persian state (to Persōn koinon) and 
the so-called elders.25 The democratic inspiration of Xenophon’s image of the 
Persian ruler is also indicated by the equation of justice with equality, a notion 
usually ascribed to democracy.26 
As another indicator of this influence we may take Mandane’s words that 
Cyrus may lose his life if he acts tyrannically upon returning home. The cult of 
the tyrant slayers (tyrannoktonoi) Harmodius and Aristogeiton was an impor-
tant part of the civic identity of Athens, and the murder of tyrants was consid-
ered a patriotic act.27 Accusing political opponents of tyrannical ambitions was 
fairly common in Athens. On the one hand, the example of Pericles shows that 
21 Xen. Cyr. 1.3.18 (transl. E. C. Marchant).
22 See Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 95–96.
23 Hdt. 1.97.2–3; 3.80.2–5, 82; Xen. Mem. 4.6.12; Arist. Pol. 1279a26–1279b10, see also 
1285a16–29.
24 Thuc. 2.65.9; see also Xen. Cyr. 1.4.25; 1.5.7; 8.7.10.
25 Xen. Cyr. 1.5.4–6; see also 1.4.25; 4.5.16–17.
26 Thuc. 2.37.1; 6.35.8; Pl. Grg. 508a; Resp. 558c, 561e; Isoc. or. 7.60–1; Arist. Pol. 1280a9–11; 
1310a30; 1317b3; see F. D. Harvey, “Two Kinds of Equality”, C&M 26 (1965), 101–146, esp. 
101, 104, 107, 110–120; E. Schütrumpf, “Aristoteles: Politik I–II, Übersetzt und erläutert von 
E. Schütrumpf ”. In Aristoteles Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. IX, Teil II, ed. H. Flashar 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1991), 478.
27 Hdt. 5.55; 6.109, 123; Ar. Lys. 631–634; Thuc. 1.20; 6.53.3–59.1, 60.1; Arist. Ath. Pol. 
18.2–6; see J. Ober, “Tyrant Killing as Therapeutic Stasis: A Political Debate in Images and 
Texts”, in Popular Tyranny. Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece, ed. K. A. Morgan 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 216–226.
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such defamations did not necessarily entail dire consequences for one’s political 
career.28 On the other hand, Alcibiades’ downfall shows the degree to which the 
behaviour that was construed as tyrannical could mean falling into disfavour 
with the demos.29 Demophantes’ decree of 410 BC shows that tyranny was per-
ceived as the main threat to the democratic order, while in fact the real danger 
was coming from the oligarchs.30
Xenophon also underlines the differences between the Persian and the 
Median model of leadership by comparing Cyrus and Cyaxares. Cyrus is rea-
sonable, self-controlled and courageous, cleverly applies the rules of reciprocity 
and is prepared to endure hardship and difficulty. As opposed to this, Cyaxares 
exemplifies a ruler who is interested more in the benefits brought by power than 
in governing. He is a weak, egotistical man who is not in control of himself and 
has an insufficient grasp of some of the basic principles of leadership.31
From what has been said so far, it follows that Xenophon’s Persian king 
bears more similarity to the Spartan kings and Athenian politicians than to a 
monarch in the traditional sense. This should not be surprising given that the 
purpose of the Cyropaedia was to instruct the Greeks, in fact the higher classes, 
in the principles of good leadership. The question that arises, however, is how to 
explain some of Cyrus’s methods which are difficult to reconcile not only with 
the ideals of the Greek polis but also with the image of the Persian king painted 
above. The methods in question are those that Cyrus resorted to after the con-
quest of Babylon.
On becoming master of Asia, the first measure introduced by Cyrus in 
order to rule in the manner he deemed befitting the Great King, or emperor, 
was to make himself inaccessible. His intention was to appear only on rare and 
formal occasions but he wanted to achieve that without giving rise to envy and 
with the consent of his friends.32 So, instead of openly declaring his intention, he 
resorted to craftiness and began granting an audience to anyone who requested 
it. As the word spread, people began to line up to see him. Cyrus was therefore 
able to make time for his friends only in the evening. When parting from them, 
he would invite them to come again the next day. However, on the following day 
even more people requested to be received. Thus, Cyrus called a meeting of his 
friends and commanders, where he complained of the lack of time, of his friends 
being able to benefit little from him, and he from them. He therefore suggested 
28 See I. Jordović, Anfänge der Jüngeren Tyrannis. Vorläufer und erste Repräsentanten von 
Gewaltherrschaft im späten 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005), 
135–139.
29 Ibid. Tyrannis, 140–171.
30 Andoc. or. 1.96–8; cf. Ober, “Tyrant Killing”, 222–224; Jordović, Tyrannis, 181–182.
31 Xen. Cyr. 4.1.13–21; 4.5.8–12, 18–21, 27–34, 37–54; 5.1.19–26; 5.5.5–44.
32 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.37.
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that they should receive the supplicants instead of him.33 His proposal was ac-
cepted to everybody’s satisfaction, as confirmed by Artabazus’ and Chrysantas’ 
speeches which followed Cyrus’s.34
This trickery recalls the cunning to which Deioces resorted in order to 
become king of the Medes.35 The story of the establishment of a monarchy in 
Media is one of the most detailed descriptions of the emergence of this particu-
lar system of government in Herodotus. This account is distinguished by ab-
stractness, rationality and absence of both divine and novelistic elements.36 The 
importance of this logos may be seen in the fact that the pater historiae uses it to 
begin his narration about Cyrus the Great.37 Herodotus characterises Deioces 
as a wise man (anēr sophos) who, from the outset, secretly yearned for absolute 
power (erastheis tirannidos). Since at that time lawlessness reigned in Media, De-
ioces strove to increase his reputation among his compatriots by exhibiting his 
love of justice. Serving as a judge in his birthplace, he became famous throughout 
Media on account of his just decisions. More and more Medes began pleading 
their cases before him, until all of Media relied on him alone for administering 
justice. Deioces then publicly announced his wish to retire from office because 
it had made him neglect his personal affairs. His announcement stirred up a 
debate among the Medes, and it was in that atmosphere that the friends of De-
ioces suggested that he should be made king, arguing that it would put an end to 
the state of lawlessness in Media. Their suggestion was widely approved by the 
Medes, and Deioces was elected king.38
There is no doubt that there are differences between these two narratives. 
But Cyrus and Deioces are similar in one respect – they both make a manipu-
lative use of their concern for the wellbeing of ordinary people by deliberately 
encouraging an ever larger number of people to petition them for help, and then 
33 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.37–47.
34 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.48–56.
35 Hdt. 1.95.2–101; see also J. G. Gammie, “Herodotus on Kings and Tyrants: Objective His-
toriography or Conventional Portraiture?”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 45 (1986), 178; 
Gera, Cyropaedia, 287–288.
36 Cf. K. H. Waters, Herodotus the Historian. His Problems, Methods and Originality (Lon-
don/Sydney: Routledge 1985), 131; U. Walter, “ ‘Da sah er das Volk ganz in seiner Hand’ 
– Deiokes und die Entstehung monarchischer Herrschaft im Geschichtswerk Herodots”, 
in Deiokes, König der Meder. Eine Herodot-Episode in ihren Kontexten, eds. M. Meier et al. 
(Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2004), 78–79; P. Barceló, Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis. Untersu-
chungen zur Entwicklung und Beurteilung von Alleinherrschaft im vorhellenistischen Griechen-
land (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1993), 167.
37 Hdt. 1.95–96.2; see P. Georges, Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience. From the Ar-
chaic Period to the Age of Xenophon (Baltimore/London: The John Hopkins University Press 
1994), 176.
38 Hdt.1.96–98.2.
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declaring that they are overwhelmed as a ruse to establish autocratic rule or to 
organise it the way they want. And they both have the support of their friends 
in that.
The influence of Herodotus’ story about Deioces becomes even more ob-
vious when we consider the measures the Mede took to fortify his power. Three 
measures may be taken as commonly practised by autocrats: the construction of 
a palace, the institution of a personal guard force and the creation of a network 
of spies.39 All three were also taken by Cyrus.40 Two more taken by Deioces were 
not so common: one was that no one should come into the presence of the king, 
but everything should be done by means of messengers; the other was that it 
should be a disgrace for anyone to laugh or to spit in the king’s presence. The idea 
was to prevent the friends who had grown up with him and were also of noble 
birth from becoming envious or rebellious, and to lead them to believe that De-
ioces was different.41 As already stated, Cyrus’s first measure betrays a similar 
way of thinking. Herodotus’ influence can also be seen in Cyrus’s decision to 
introduce Median dress and make-up at court, together with his ban on spitting, 
nose-blowing or turning around to look at anything in public, all motivated by 
the desire to bewitch (katagoēteuein) his subjects.42
Besides similarities with Deioces, there are other circumstances which 
indicate that Cyrus followed the Median model of rule. The decision to make 
Median pomp mandatory at his court is perhaps the most obvious but certainly 
not the only one. Just before he began to set up his system of power, Cyrus 
ordered the Persians and his allies to assume the attitude of masters (despotai) 
towards the Babylonians.43 Recognition that he is to rule over the largest of all 
famous cites, and that that city is as hostile to him as any city can be to a man, 
underpins his need for bodyguards and ten thousand spearmen.44 The attitude 
of a victor resurfaces in Cyrus’ announcement to his friends and allies that even 
though the conqueror is entitled, by a law established for all time among all men, 
to take it all, they should nevertheless refrain from taking everything away from 
the vanquished population.45
39 Hdt. 1.98.2–6, 100.2.
40 Palace: Xen. Cyr. 7.5.56–57; body guard: Xen. Cyr. 7.5.58–70; spies: Xen. Cyr. 8.2.10–12; 
8.6.16.
41 Hdt. 1.99–100.1; see V. Azoulay, “Xenophon and the Barbarian World”, in Xenophon and 
his World. Papers from a conference held in Liverpool in July 1999, ed. C. Tuplin (Stuttgart: 
Steiner Verlag, 2004), 151–153.
42 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.40–42; see also 8.3.1; cf. Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 90; Azoulay, “Xeno-
phon”, 147–148, 150.
43 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.36.
44 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.58–70, esp. 58.
45 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.73.
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This attitude may explain why Xenophon directly links his hero to the 
Median model of rule, on which he passes negative judgment in the preceding 
parts of the Cyropaedia. In describing how Cyrus structures his imperial author-
ity, Xenophon tells us that the conquest of Babylon led to an important change 
in Cyrus’s style of leadership.46 Explaining why it would be desirable for his 
friends to take on the receiving of petitioners, Cyrus makes a clear distinction 
between the time when he was a military commander and the moment when he 
became the Great King.47 However, the essential difference is not in that he has 
become a ruler, since he was predestined for the position by birth,48 but in that 
he has become the ruler of an empire. This is confirmed by Cyrus himself when 
he exhorts his friends and allies to continue nurturing virtue, since it is a great 
feat to win an empire (archē) but it is an even greater one to keep it.49 Another 
point in favour of this is that Xenophon, at the beginning of the Cyropaedia, sug-
gests that his hero differs from other kings not because he has inherited power 
or won it, but rather because he has subjugated numerous foreign peoples, i.e. 
created an empire.50
That Cyrus’s becoming ruler of an empire is a key to resolving apparent 
contradictions is also reflected in his differentiation between two categories of 
subjects.51 It is strongly present in his speech following the establishment of his 
bodyguard force and ten thousand spearmen. Aware that these forces are insuf-
ficient to maintain the empire (archē), Cyrus turns to those with whose support 
he achieved military successes and rose to power, and these are the Persian ho-
motimoi, the commanders and all those with whom he shared both hardship and 
success.52 In his speech, he urges his friends and allies to continue to cultivate 
their virtue (aretē) and abilities. This is necessary because rulers must be bet-
ter than their subjects, and the conditions for that are temperance (sōphrosynē), 
self-mastery (enkrateia) and diligence (epimeleia).53 Laws of warfare entitle the 
victorious side, Cyrus’s friends and allies, to the spoils of war, but they nonethe-
46 See Gera, Cyropaedia, 184, 286; Azoulay, “Xenophon”, 147.
47 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.45–47; see Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 217.
48 Xen. Cyr. 7.2.24; 8.5.26.
49 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.76, see also 7.5.70; 8.1.8, 45; 8.6.17; cf. Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 
219–220.
50 Xen. Cyr. 1.1.4–5; see Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 59.
51 See also Azoulay, “Xenophon”, 160; H. Lu, Xenophon’s Theory of Moral Education (Newcas-
tle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 133.
52 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.70–71. This was why Cyrus did not appoint satraps to govern some regions 
that had joined his campaign against Babylon (Xen. Cyr. 8.6.7).
53 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.70, 74–76, 78, 80–81, 83, 84–85 cf. Mem. 2.1.1–7; Isoc. or. 2.9–16, 21, 27, 
36–37; 3.14–15, 38–39, 43–44, 48–52. Epimeleia is an important concept to Xenophon, by 
which he understands the conscientious fulfilment of one’s duty and the execution of the as-
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less should show love of their fellow humans (philanthropia) and refrain from 
taking everything from the conquered.54 Cyrus thus shows that he expects them 
to behave as he himself does. He therefore intends for them the same position 
in his empire that the homotimoi enjoyed in Old Persia – that of a ruling elite. 
Cyrus obviously has no intention of essentially changing his behaviour towards 
them. This is seen in the fact that he avoids simply ordering them to cultivate 
virtue, but rather strives in his speech to convince them that it is the best thing 
for them.55 Referring to these friends and allies of Cyrus, Xenophon uses the 
word “associates” (koinōnes), and not “peers”, i.e. men of equal honour (homoti-
moi). This means that they represent the elite of the newly-formed Persian em-
pire, not of the Persian kingdom, and that their relative ranking depends on 
their loyalty to the Great King.56
The position intended for the vanquished population is the same as that 
enjoyed by the subjects of eastern despots – they are free but politically disem-
powered. Theirs is to tend to the land and pay tribute,57 as evidenced by the fact 
that they and their property belong to the victors, and that Cyrus twice likens 
them to slaves (douloi).58 The comparison with slaves should not, however, be 
taken to imply the deprivation of all rights, as is shown by the account of Cyrus’s 
actions when he first conquered a territory and its population in the fourth book 
of the Cyropaedia. Cyrus announces to the prisoners that they have saved their 
lives by submitting. They will continue to live in the same houses and cultivate 
the same land, but will not have to wage war. If someone does them harm, Cyrus 
will defend them, and in return they must surrender their arms. All this shows 
that the subjugated population is only deprived of their rights in political terms, 
even though Cyrus also uses the term doulos for them.59 The fact that the terms 
archē and douleia are used in reference to Cyrus’s rule is also significant since they 
constitute an important conceptual pair, or dichotomy, in Athenian democratic 
ideology.60
signed task; see K. Meyer, Xenophons “Oikonomikos”. Übersetzung und Kommentar (Marburg: 
P. Kaesberger Westerburg, 1975), 104–106.
54 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.72–73.
55 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.71, 85; see also 8.6.4–5; cf. Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 218.
56 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.16, 25, 36, 40; see Azouley, “Xenophon”, 159–160; Johnson, “Centaurs”, 188.
57 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.78–79.
58 Xen. Cyr. 7.5.72–73, 78–79, 83–84.
59 Xen. Cyr. 4.4.8–12. A terminology of servitude is applicable to the subjugated population 
because Cyrus remarks that those who show goodwill by their actions or by supplying useful 
information will be treated as benefactors (euergetēs) and friends (philos), and not as slaves 
(doulos). 
60 See K. Raaflaub, The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 128–141; U. Kästner, “Bezeichnungen für Sklaven”, in Soziale Typen-
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After Cyrus, it is Chrysantas’ turn to speak and he essentially gives the 
same counsel as his ruler. It is apparent that he does not consider Cyrus a despot; 
otherwise he would not say of him that he is a good ruler because he is seeing to 
it in a fatherly way that they lead a happy life.61 Chrysantas’ speech focuses on 
the importance of obedience in achieving and maintaining success. This is sub-
stantiated by a reference to the importance of obedience to the military leader 
and its significance for the success of the Persians and their allies in war.62 The 
Persian nobleman points out that a major change has occurred. Many of those 
present have never commanded anyone but only carried out orders, while from 
now on every one of them, depending on his duties, will have a certain number 
of men under his command. Therefore, just as they expect their subordinates to 
carry out their orders, they too must obey their superiors. According to Chry-
santas, however, those present must be distinguished from slaves: while the lat-
ter serve their masters against their will, those who claim to be free (eleutheroi) 
do so because they hold it to be of the utmost importance.63
Since Chrysantas’ words met with general approval, it was decided that 
the nobles (entimoi) should be always in attendance at court. Military com-
manders, satraps, superintendents etc. were appointed from their ranks.64 Cyrus 
centralised his government administration on the model of the army.65 Having 
ensured leisure (scholē) for his friends and associates, he believed that those of 
them who even then failed to spend time at court were intemperate (akrateia), 
unrighteous (adikia) and negligent (ameleia).66 Cyrus used diverse means to 
force such individuals to make their appearance at court. He would order one 
of his closest friends to seize some of their estates and when they came to court 
seeking justice, Cyrus deliberately delayed judgement in order to accustom them 
to pay their court, but without subjecting them to penalties. A second measure 
was to give the regular attendees the easiest and most lucrative assignments and 
nothing to the truants. From those who remained impervious, he confiscated 
all possessions and gave them to those who responded immediately when sum-
moned. These measures cannot be identified with tyrannical arbitrariness, since 
they correspond to the logic of reciprocity, as Xenophon himself points out 
begriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt, vol. 3: Untersuchun-
gen ausgewählter altgriechischer sozialer Typenbegriffe, ed. E. Ch. Welskopf (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 1981), 297.
61 See Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 223.
62 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.1–3.
63 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.4–5.
64 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.6–12.
65 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.14–15.
66 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.16.
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when he says that in this way Cyrus replaced a useless friend with a useful one.67 
Notwithstanding his demand for total obedience, Cyrus’s attitude towards his 
friends and associates was not tyrannical.68 Xenophon points this out when he 
describes Cyrus’s endeavour to be a model of virtue to his courtiers, his piety, 
how he made it plain how important he held it to be not to wrong any of his 
friends or allies, his effort to inspire in all respect for others, to be a model of 
temperance (sōphrosynē) even though he more than anyone was able to indulge 
himself to excess (hybrizein), how he trained himself and others in self-mastery 
(enkrateia) and to endure toil (ponos). Furthermore, Cyrus differentiates be-
tween considerateness (aidōs) and temperance (sōphrosynē). A considerate per-
son avoids behaving disgracefully in public, but a temperate person also avoids 
that which is shameful even if it goes unseen.69 Finally, one more indication that 
Cyrus’s rule was devoid of tyrannical features is that he instructed the satraps to 
emulate his style of rule. Here he says that his instructions (such as temperance, 
endurance, skill in the martial arts, and attendance at court) are not intended for 
slaves, and that he himself will strive to act in the way he has recommended to 
them.70 All this shows that Cyrus and his associates (koinōnes), notwithstanding 
their embracing of the Median ceremonial, remained true to the Persian ideal of 
firmness and restraint.71
According to Xenophon, Cyrus believed that the greatest danger did not 
come from the vanquished population but from individuals he deemed power-
ful. They were well armed, well organised, had military units at their disposal 
and came into contact not only with Cyrus’s bodyguards but also with him, and 
some even imagined that they were competent to rule. And yet, he neither dis-
armed them nor openly showed his distrust. Had he done the former, he would 
have done an injustice which might lead to the break-up of his archē; had he done 
the latter he believed it might lead to (a civil) war. Therefore Cyrus, now as Great 
King, decides instead to forestall danger by enticing the powerful into becoming 
greater friends to him than they are amongst themselves.72 Xenophon then cites 
examples of Cyrus’s kindness, philanthropy and deft use of reciprocity.73
While seeking not to weaken his associates (koinōnes) even at the cost 
of risking his own authority, Cyrus opted for an entirely different approach to 
67 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.17–20, 29.
68 An argument in favour of this claim is that Cyrus heeded his father’s suggestion that the 
best obedience is voluntary obedience (Xen. Cyr. 1.6.20–4; 2.4.10).
69 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.21–37; cf. Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 227–228.
70 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10–14; see also Isoc. or. 2.31.
71 See Azoulay, “Xenophon”, 163–169.
72 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.45–48.
73 Xen. Cyr. 8.2.1–28; 8.4.1–26.
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the subjugated population. Instilling fear into them was obviously one.74 Fur-
thermore, not only did he not encourage those he intended should serve (dou-
leuein) to practise virtue and skills, he did not permit them to practise any of 
the exercises of freemen (eleutheroi ponoi) or to possess weapons. Yet, he took 
care that they should not suffer any deprivation in food or drink on account of 
their service to the freemen in order to forestall their discontent and lead them 
to endure the fate of slaves (andrapoda) unquestioningly. Thus ensuring that the 
subjugated population remained weak and disorganised, Cyrus took care that it 
should not become a source of danger for his rule.75
From the speeches of Cyrus and Chrysantas as presented in Xenophon 
and from his depiction of the measures taken by Cyrus, it may be deduced that 
there were two kinds of subjects. One comprises Cyrus’s friends and associ-
ates, who constitute the elite of the empire. They are subordinated but they also 
exercise authority; they are free, have leisure, pursue their virtues and military 
skills.76 The Persian model of exercising authority applies to them. To the other 
kind belong the rest of the population, personally free but politically deprived. 
They have no leisure and do not practise virtue or skills. For these subjects, the 
terminology of servitude is used, although obviously they are not personally un-
free. To them, the Median model of exercising authority applies. The question 
arises as to why Xenophon makes this distinction. It is hardly likely that he 
wished to synchronise the account of the Persian empire with historical reality; 
in the Cyropaedia, he does not hesitate to depart from it whenever it suits him. 
More importantly, the distinction does not match historical reality in any way. 
However, it is probable that Xenophon’s motive for first emphasising the differ-
ence between the Persian and the Median model was to be able to demonstrate 
that his hero applies both to his empire.
It may be pertinent to note here that Xenophon’s introduction of two 
models of leadership (Persian and Median) matches Isocrates’ differentiation 
between two categories of citizens in his To Nicocles.77 A comparison with some 
of Aristotle’s political categories may be useful for better understanding the mo-
tive for introducing two models of authority or two kinds of subjects in the 
account of Cyrus’s empire.78 The Politics distinguishes between the virtue of a 
74 Xen. Cyr. 1.1.5.
75 Xen. Cyr. 8.1.43–5; cf. 7.5.78–9; 8.6.13. The term doulos can denote slavery but it can also 
signify political submission or the subjugation of a land, see Kästner, “Bezeichnungen für 
Sklaven”, 297. The term andrapodon could denote both a slave and a prisoner of war, and was 
used as a synonym for doulos, see ibid. 290, 313–314.
76 Isoc. or. 3.62.
77 Isoc. or. 2.16; cf. 3.14–15; see also Xen. Mem. 2.1.1–7.
78 This comparison is not meant to suggest any kind of equivalence between Xenophon’s and 
Aristotle’s political views. 
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good man (aretē andros agathou) and the virtue of a good citizen (aretē politou 
spoudaiou). While the virtue of the good citizen is geared towards the constitu-
tion of which he is a member, the good man possesses virtue which is not rela-
tive to any particular constitution.79 Given Xenophon’s idealisation of his hero 
and the fact that the main aim of the Cyropaedia is to present the principle of 
good leadership regardless of the form of constitution, Cyrus may be said to 
possess the virtue of Aristotle’s good man.80 In the Politics, a distinction is also 
made between despotic and political exercise of authority.81 Despotic author-
ity (despotikē archē) is rule over slaves for the benefit of the master in order to 
acquire the necessities of life, so the ruler knows how to govern, but not how 
to perform these (slave’s) tasks. Aristotle, it is true, believes that this kind of 
authority is characteristic of the oikos, but at the same time admits that in reality 
it is also a political phenomenon, an unnatural anachronism and a degenerate 
form of a true political system.82
Political authority (politikē archē) is rule over people who are equal and 
free by virtue of birth. It is learned by first being ruled (archesthai), and then 
ruling (archein). To illustrate his point, Aristotle offers the example of military 
leadership – the military leader first serves as a soldier, taxiarch and lochage, and 
only then takes command. A similar reflection arises in Chrysantas when he 
tells how Cyrus’s associates once only were given orders whereas now they will 
exercise authority; since they are free, they should voluntarily give their obedi-
ence to those whom it is their duty to obey.83 Aristotle believes that the good 
citizen should have the ability both to be ruled and to rule, and holds this to be a 
79 Arist. Pol. 1276b29–35.
80 Cf. Arist. Pol. 1277a14–23.
81 Arist. Pol. 1277a33–b16; see K. Raaflaub, “Zum Freiheitsbegriff der Griechen. Materialien 
und Untersuchungen zur Bedeutungsentwicklung von eleutheros/eleutheria in der archais-
chen und klassischen Zeit”, in Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in 
den Sprachen der Welt, vol. 4: Untersuchungen ausgewählter altgriechischer sozialer Typenbegriffe 
und ihr Fortleben in Antike und Mittelalter, ed. E. Ch. Welskopf (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1981), 308–309; Schütrumpf, Politik I–II, 428–429; A. Winterling, “Aristoteles’ Theorie der 
politischen Gesellschaft”. In Philosophie und Lebenswelt in der Antike, ed. K. Piepenbrink 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003), 70, 79.
82 Aristot. Pol. 1255b16, 1259a37, 1277a33–35, 1278b30–36; 1279a17–21, 1279b4–10, 
1324a35–38, 1325a28–30, 1333a3–6, 1333b27–29; see E. Schütrumpf, “Politik. Buch I: 
Über die Hausverwaltung und die Herrschaft des Herrn über Sklaven, Übersetzt und er-
läutert von E. Schütrumpf ”, in Aristoteles Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, vol. IX/I, ed. H. 
Flashar (Darmstadt: Akademie Verlag, 1991), 126–128, 256–257; Schütrumpf, Politik I–II, 
435, 441, 455, 457–458; F. Ricken, “Platon: Politikos, Übersetzung und Kommentar von F. 
Ricken”, in  Platon Werke, vol. II.4, eds. E. Heitsch and C. W. Müller (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 252–253.
83 Arist. Pol. 1277b7–13; Xen. Cyr. 8.1.2–5.
I. Jordović,  Kingdom versus Empire in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia 49
virtue. This is basically what Cyrus expects from his satraps when he tells them 
that they should model their authority on his example. Cyrus himself had first 
learnt to submit himself, as shown by his schooling at the school of justice, his 
sojourn at Astyages’s court and his discussion with Cambyses. Only after that 
was he appointed military commander.84
Aristotle further says that the best-ordered state will not make citizens 
out of artisans and day-labourers. Should it happen nonetheless, they will not 
have the virtue of truly free (good) citizens since they do not have the leisure 
required for exercising public offices (archai). This reflection, too, finds an anal-
ogy in the account of the “imperial” koinōnes. They have the leisure to exercise 
authority, they practise virtue, practise any of the exercises of freemen (eleutheroi 
ponoi), and Xenophon calls them the eleutheroi.85 Cyrus’s koinōnes, therefore, es-
sentially correspond to the good citizens in the Politics, from which it follows 
that Xenophon’s Persian model of exercising authority corresponds to Aristot-
le’s politikē archē. This eliminates vagueness and inconsistency, since it shows that 
Xenophon pursues the aristocratic-oligarchic concept of the truly free citizen, as 
represented from the late fifth century onward by many authors who certainly 
were not advocates of rule by the demos.86 Accordingly, freedom is equated with 
the right to rule, but this right is not enjoyed by all free individuals within the 
community, only by those who are not pressed by the necessity to work for their 
living, or those who have the necessary scholē time to cultivate virtue and partici-
pate in political life. As against the truly free citizens are those who do not share 
in political life (artisans, day-labourers, metics, women, children and slaves). Al-
though some of these groups (e.g. artisans and day-labourers) also have citizen 
status, they are still held to be incomplete citizens (politai ateleis).87
Yet another similarity with the Politics points to Xenophon’s espousal of 
the aristocratic-oligarchic idea of the truly free citizen. Having presented the rea-
sons why artisans cannot be considered citizens in the fullest sense, Aristotle 
cites examples of when and where they were or were not. As one instance of their 
deprivation of political rights he cites Thebes, where a law decreed that public 
84 Arist. Pol. 1277b11–16; Cyrus: Xen. Cyr. 1.3.1, 16–18, 1.4.13; 1.5.1; 1.6.3, 6, 8, 12–16, 
21–23, 27–37; satraps: Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10–14.
85 Arist. Pol. 1277b33–1278a39; Xen. Cyr. 8.1.13–14, 16, 43–44, 8.6.13–14; see Raaflaub, 
“Zum Freiheitsbegriff ”, 309, Schütrumpf, Politik I–II, 435.
86 See Raaflaub, Discovery, 243–247; S. Johnstone, “Virtuous Toil, Vicious Work: Xenophon 
on Aristocratic Style”. In Xenophon, ed. V. J. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 
155.
87 Arist. Pol. 1277b33–1278a6–13; 1337b5–14; see Raaflaub, “Zum Freiheitsbegriff ”, 301–
313, esp. 307–308; D. Rössler, “Handwerker”, in Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland 
und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt, vol. 3: Untersuchungen ausgewählter altgriechischer 
sozialer Typenbegriffe, ed. E. Ch. Welskopf (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1981), 229–230.
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office could only be taken by persons who had kept out of the trade at the agora 
(apeschēmenon tēs agoras) for ten years.88 A similar rule is also mentioned by 
Xenophon in his Oeconomicus. Interestingly, immediately after that he cites the 
Persian emperor and Cyrus the Younger as examples of engagement in honour-
able occupations – art of war and husbandry. It is clear from this that being en-
gaged in agriculture does not imply personally tilling the land, but rather seeing 
to it that others work in the correct manner.89 Furthermore, in the Symposium 
the illiberal arts (banausikai technai) constitute the exact opposite of the kalo-
kagathia ideal.90 Of all the similarities, however, the most striking is that, in the 
Cyropaedia, the Persian model of exercising authority is directly related to this 
kind of ban. In his brief description of the Persian system, Xenophon points out 
that the Persians have a so-called free square (eleuthera agora), supposed to pre-
vent citizens from even thinking of committing wicked or disgraceful acts, and 
so the tradesmen and their goods have been removed from it. The square houses 
the royal palace and government buildings, and serves as a gathering point for 
those undergoing the Persian educational system or who are already in public 
service, i.e. fully-fledged citizens.91 All this shows that Xenophon embraced the 
concept of the truly free citizen. The concept originated in critical response to the 
democratic ideology of freedom, but still does not make Xenophon an adamant 
oligarch, which may be seen from two observations made by Aristotle. One is 
that of all types of democracy, the participation of artisans (banausoi) in govern-
ment appears only in democracy’s ultimate form; the other is that banausoi may 
be citizens in an oligarchy too.92 Xenophon says that all the Persians may send 
their children to the schools of justice, but only those do send them who are 
in a position to support their families without working.93 Xenophon, therefore, 
does not cite low origin or mental and physical inferiority as reasons for the 
non-participation of Persian commoners in government. Moreover, his Cyrus 
points out that the Persian commoners lag behind the peers neither in body nor 
in spirit, except that they have to work for their livelihood.94 Finally, there is the 
88 Arist. Pol. 1278a25–26; see W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, With an Introduction, 
Two Prefatory Essays and Notes Critical and Explanatory, vol. III: Books III, IV, and V (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 178; Schütrumpf, Politik I–II, 441.
89 Xen. Oec. 4.2–25; 6.5, 9, esp. 4.2–4; 6.9; see also Lac. 7.1–2; cf. Meyer, Oikonomikos, 111–
112; Rössler, “Handwerker”, 241–242; L. Kronenberg, Allegories of Farming from Greece and 
Rome. Philosophical Satire in Xenophon, Varro and Virgil (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 42–44; Johnstone, “Virtuous Toil”, 155, 159–166, esp. 159–160.
90 Xen. Symp. 3.4; cf. Rössler, “Handwerker”, 242.
91 Xen. Cyr. 1.2.3–4, 15.
92 Arist. Pol. 1277b1–3, 1278a21–25.
93 Xen. Cyr. 1.2.15.
94 Xen. Cyr. 2.1.15–19, esp. 15; cf. Nadon, “Education”, 364–365.
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example of Pheraulus, a Persian commoner whom Cyrus considers one of his 
most capable and trusted friends.95 This goes to show that Xenophon linked the 
concept of the truly free citizen to meritocracy. The binding nature of this prin-
ciple for the koinōnes is manifest in Cyrus’s belief that no one is worthy of ruling 
who is not better than his subjects, and in the fact that Cyrus himself always 
rewarded those who distinguished themselves, and expected his satraps to sur-
round themselves with able individuals and to reward ability and good service.96
UDC 94(35):321.18(093.3=14’02)
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